The world's first PolySure™-certified daily nutrition system engineered specifically for GLP-1 receptor agonist therapy patients.
30 million Americans projected on GLP-1 therapy by 2030. Every one of them eating less. None of them with a purpose-built, physician-backed, bioactive nutrition system to close the nutritional gap. Until now. This document is the full business case, financial forecast, stress test, and investment thesis.
GLP-1 receptor agonists are the most significant pharmaceutical shift in metabolic medicine in a generation. They have also created a nutritional problem that nobody has solved.
GLP-1 receptor agonists — semaglutide, tirzepatide, liraglutide — suppress appetite to a degree that produces dramatic weight loss. But appetite suppression is not selective. Patients eating 40–60% less total calories are not eating 40–60% less of specific nutrients. They are simply eating less of everything.
The documented downstream consequences are consistent across the clinical literature: lean muscle mass loss, B12 depletion, gut microbiome disruption, collagen breakdown, electrolyte imbalance, and persistent fatigue. The pharmaceutical side has been solved. The nutritional side has not.
The US GLP-1 therapy market is growing at a pace that has no historical analogue in pharmaceutical adoption. Telehealth platforms — Calibrate, Ro, Found, Sequence — are processing tens of thousands of new patient initiations each month. Employer health programmes are adding GLP-1 coverage. Direct-to-consumer prescribing via app is normalising.
Every one of these channels represents an underserved patient who will experience the nutritional gap created by their medication. This system is designed to close that gap — through the most defensible bioactive platform in the world.
Accelerated weight loss from caloric restriction leads to lean mass catabolism. Without targeted protein delivery, patients lose not just fat but functional muscle.
Delayed gastric emptying and reduced food volume disrupt the gut microbiome. Constipation is the most commonly reported GI complaint in GLP-1 therapy patients.
Long-term GLP-1 patients show documented B12 depletion. Rapid weight loss simultaneously degrades collagen production — skin, joints, connective tissue.
Suppressed appetite creates chronic low-grade energy deficits. Single-sugar energy formats spike and crash — incompatible with GLP-1 metabolic profiles.
Four single-use 20–25g tear-top gel sachets. Zero prep. Designed to be taken at four defined moments across the day — each targeting a specific, documented GLP-1 nutritional risk.
The only grab-and-go energy sachet delivering dual-carb sustained fuel, natural Vitamin C from NZ gold kiwifruit, and PolySure™-validated Mānuka bioactives — in a 20g serve designed for reduced-appetite GLP-1 patients.
The same PolySure™-backed dual-carb Mānuka energy platform as SKU 01 — delivered through a crisp green apple profile that drives daily compliance through taste variety. Because the best nutrition system is the one you actually stick to.
The only protein recovery sachet using PolySure™-certified Mānuka honey as the bioactive carrier matrix — delivering 10–12g of high-quality protein alongside validated polyphenols in a grab-and-go format targeting GLP-1-associated lean muscle loss.
A single 20g sachet addressing three of the most common and least-served GLP-1 side effects simultaneously: gut microbiome disruption (BC30™, FDA GRAS), B12 depletion, and skin/connective tissue degradation — via PolySure™-certified Mānuka.
Most supplement brands use a single bioactivity marker. We track seven polyphenols per batch, from NZ native honey varieties no competitor can source. This is not marketing. It is a structural moat.
| Standard | What It Tracks | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| MGO (Mānuka grade) | Single marker — methylglyoxal only | Insufficient |
| Competitor label claims | Unverified — no third-party CoA | Unverifiable |
| Commodity honey blends | No polyphenol tracking at all | Zero basis |
| PolySure™ | 7 polyphenols, ISO-17025, CoA every batch | Industry-leading |
GLP-1 patients and their physicians are sophisticated. They have accepted a medication with known side effects because the clinical evidence is overwhelming. They apply the same evidence standard to nutrition. "Natural honey" is not sufficient. A CoA from an ISO-17025 accredited lab tracking seven polyphenols every batch is.
For the telehealth B2B channel, PolySure™ is not a marketing badge — it is the compliance credential that allows a physician platform to recommend the product to patients without clinical liability concern. No competitor can offer this. The supply chain runs through NZ native honey varieties that cannot be replicated offshore.
Fructose and glucose are absorbed via different intestinal transporters (GLUT5 and GLUT2 respectively). Combining them produces measurably higher carbohydrate oxidation rates than either alone — the mechanism behind the International Journal of Sports Nutrition's dual-carb research. In GLP-1 patients with reduced gastric emptying, this sustained-release profile avoids the glucose spike-and-crash incompatible with GLP-1 metabolic profiles.
Six-channel revenue build. Blended gross margin 60%. Conservative base case assumptions fully referenced in the investor forecast workbook.
A $2M seed investment returning $662K Y3 EBITDA requires the EV exit story to do the heavy lifting. Here is the full scenario stack — Bear to Upside — with enterprise value implications at realistic acquirer multiples.
Amazon launch delayed, telehealth B2B stalls at 1 platform, COGS higher than modelled. Capital destruction scenario. Existential trigger.
Current model. Six channels as modelled. Marginal for venture. Acceptable for a strategic investor who sees platform IP value layered on top of EBITDA.
3 telehealth platforms, Amazon SEO wins category, D2C churn below 5%, GM expansion to 63% at volume, OPEX discipline maintained.
5+ telehealth platforms, employer health volume, B2B ingredient licensing activated, retail pilot Y3, PolySure™ IP recognised by acquirer. This is the fund-returning scenario.
Y3 EBITDA × EV multiple across scenarios. MoM shown on illustrative $5M post-money seed entry. Green = minimum venture threshold. Gold = fund-returning.
| Scenario / Multiple → | 6× | 8× | 10× | 12× | 15× | 18× | 20× | 25× |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear ($365K EBITDA) | $2.2M 0.4× |
$2.9M 0.6× |
$3.7M 0.7× |
$4.4M 0.9× |
$5.5M 1.1× |
$6.6M 1.3× |
$7.3M 1.5× |
$9.1M 1.8× |
| Base ($662K EBITDA) | $4.0M 0.8× |
$5.3M 1.1× |
$6.6M 1.3× |
$7.9M 1.6× |
$9.9M 2.0× |
$11.9M 2.4× |
$13.2M 2.6× |
$16.6M 3.3× |
| Bull ($1.11M EBITDA) | $6.7M 1.3× |
$8.9M 1.8× |
$11.1M 2.2× |
$13.3M 2.7× |
$16.7M 3.3× |
$20.0M 4.0× |
$22.2M 4.4× |
$27.8M 5.6× |
| Upside ($1.82M EBITDA) | $10.9M 2.2× |
$14.6M 2.9× |
$18.2M 3.6× |
$21.8M 4.4× |
$27.3M 5.5× |
$32.8M 6.6× |
$36.4M 7.3× |
$45.5M 9.1× |
MoM = multiple on $5M illustrative post-money seed entry. EV multiples: CPG peers 5–12×, digital health 10–20×, nutraceutical M&A 8–15×. Strategic acquirer premium can exceed 20×. Not a valuation opinion — independent advice required.
What actually moves the return from base case to upside. Each lever is independently executable and quantifiable.
Each additional platform (Calibrate, Ro, Found, Sequence, Noom, Life MD) adds $180–540K annual revenue at scale. Five platforms = $900K+ B2B revenue alone — at near-zero incremental COGS. This is a licensing model with CPG economics hidden inside it.
Every 1% reduction in monthly churn extends average subscriber life by 2+ months. GLP-1 therapy is long-term by nature — a physician-reinforced community model should drive churn well below the 6.5% base assumption. 6.5% → 4.0% = $340K additional LTV per 1,000 active subscribers.
First-mover in the nascent 'GLP-1 supplements' Amazon category. Channel Key SEO + PolySure™ clinical claims + physician endorsement copy = defensible ranking moat. Top-3 organic rank in category within 9 months is achievable. Y3 upside: $2.5M+ Amazon net revenue if kit AOV holds at scale.
GLP-1 employer coverage is the fastest-growing HR benefit in the US. JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, and Walmart already cover GLP-1 drugs. The logical next step is nutrition adjacency — and there is no incumbent. One Fortune 500 wellness programme = $500K–$2M annual contract. Currently modelled at just $38K Y3.
Licensing PolySure™ to pharma-adjacent GLP-1 manufacturers, meal replacement brands, or clinical nutrition companies = high-margin royalty stream with no additional COGS. This is the hidden asset that elevates the EV multiple from CPG to platform. Not modelled. Should be.
60% → 65% GM as volume scales = $165K additional Y3 EBITDA at base revenue. Manufacturing scale + NZ supply chain optimisation + premium pricing power from PolySure™ certification should drive this. Each 1% GM improvement = $33K additional EBITDA at base revenue, $79K at upside revenue.
Strategic acquirers — Nestlé Health Science, Hims & Hers, Ro, Abbott Nutrition, Amway — pay 15–25× for category-defining CPG + clinical credibility + distribution infrastructure. The PolySure™ IP and telehealth B2B network is what gets you to the top of that range. Map the exit buyer universe before approaching investors.
Canada GLP-1 adoption mirrors US trajectory with an 18-month lag. Australia follows. NZ FernMark + PolySure™ credentials carry international premium. International is currently modelled at $30K Y2 and $66K Y3 — deeply conservative. A single Canadian telehealth partnership changes this number materially.
Two-way sensitivity on Y3 EBITDA across revenue scale and gross margin. OPEX held at base $1.31M. Green = investor-presentable. Gold = fund-returning.
| Revenue Scale (Y3) ↓ GM → | 50% | 54% | 57% | 60% | 63% | 65% | 68% |
|---|
Dark green = EBITDA >$1M. Green = positive EBITDA. Amber = near break-even. Red = loss-making. Base OPEX $1.31M. Base revenue $3.29M.
The single most important two-variable sensitivity in the model. Telehealth B2B is the highest-margin, lowest-CAC channel.
| TH Platforms ↓ D2C Subs (Y3 end) → | 800 | 1,200 | 1,600 | 2,200 | 3,000 | 4,000 |
|---|
Assumes $70 blended ARPU, 12 months, 80% utilisation. Amazon net ~$1.11M base. Other channels ~$147K. OPEX $1.31M. GM 60%.
The channel strategy is sequenced deliberately: physician credibility (HCP) feeds telehealth B2B, which feeds D2C subscription, which funds Amazon SEO, which builds brand awareness for corporate. Each channel reinforces the others.
Full Daily System Kit subscribe & save. Highest LTV channel. Physician referral feeds new subscriber pipeline. HCP recommendation drives Full System adoption (vs individual packs). Community, NPS programme, and physician check-ins reduce churn below benchmark.
Launches Month 4. Channel Key for SEO, listing optimisation, and PPC management. PolySure™ clinical claims, physician endorsement copy, and BC30™ FDA GRAS status all translate directly to Amazon conversion. Target: top-3 rank in 'GLP-1 supplements' category within 9 months of launch.
Wholesale supply to telehealth GLP-1 platforms. Patients already on GLP-1 therapy — highest-intent nutrition buyers on the market. Platform agreement = recurring per-patient revenue with near-zero CAC. Dr Marc Stevens (CMO / US Co-President, MD) leads physician relationship development and contract negotiation.
Direct clinic orders and physician sampling programme. Marc-led outreach to GLP-1 prescribers, bariatric surgeons, and metabolic medicine specialists. 10-sachet clinical sleeve + physician one-pager is the entry point. Each converted physician becomes a recurring D2C referral engine and telehealth B2B pipeline source.
Employer GLP-1 gifting and wellness programme integration. Fortune 500 HR benefit managers adding GLP-1 coverage are the next buyer — nutrition adjacency is logical. Currently modelled conservatively at $12K Y1, $38K Y3. One enterprise contract changes this number by an order of magnitude.
Canada GLP-1 adoption mirrors the US with an 18-month lag. Australia follows. FernMark licensing and NZ provenance carry measurable premium in both markets. Zero Y1 — intentional. Y2 Canada test ($30K) informs Y3 full activation. A single Canadian telehealth partnership (Maple, Dialogue) unlocks the model.
Structured deployment across five categories. Front-loaded inventory and demand generation. Working capital reserve provides cash bridge to Y2 EBITDA positive.
Sachet manufacturing run, US freight, FDA/DSHEA compliance, safety buffer. 3-month initial stock. Front-loaded Q1 — de-risks supply chain for launch.
Paid social, HCP sampling programme, Amazon Channel Key engagement, PR, launch content. Phased Q1–Q3 with heavier Q2–Q3 as channels activate.
Dr Marc US operations + 1 ops/sales hire + NZ team partial allocation. Even quarterly phasing — ongoing fixed cost.
DSHEA label compliance, CoA programme continuation, claim review, Informed Sport final certification. Front-loaded Q1.
Cash bridge to Y2 EBITDA positivity. 3-month operating buffer. Held back Q3–Q4 Y1.
$2M provides 18 months of runway against a Y1 EBITDA loss of $215K — with $1.785M of capital still available after covering the operating gap. The largest single line item (inventory, $600K) directly de-risks the most common early-stage CPG failure mode: stockout on launch demand.
Y2 EBITDA positive at $286K eliminates any bridge round requirement. The capital efficiency story is strong: $2M to $286K EBITDA in 24 months, with a clear pathway to $662K EBITDA at base case and $1.8M+ at upside.
| Inventory & Supply Chain | $600,000 |
| Marketing & Digital Demand | $500,000 |
| People & Operations | $500,000 |
| R&D, Regulatory & Compliance | $200,000 |
| Working Capital Reserve | $200,000 |
| Total Seed Round | $2,000,000 |
Per-channel lifetime value, customer acquisition cost, and payback period. D2C and Amazon both exceed 10× LTV:CAC — exceptional for early-stage CPG.
| Metric | D2C Sub | Amazon | Telehealth B2B | HCP / Clinic | Corp Wellness |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Avg monthly revenue / customer | $70 | $53 | $18 | $56 | $75 |
| Monthly churn rate | 6.5% | 12.0% | 4.0% | 8.0% | 25.0% |
| Implied avg subscriber months | 15.4mo | 8.3mo | 25.0mo | 12.5mo | 4.0mo |
| Customer LTV (gross) | $1,078 | $441 | $450 | $700 | $300 |
| Gross Margin LTV (at 60%) | $647 | $265 | $270 | $420 | $180 |
| Estimated CAC | $35 | $22 | $120 | $85 | $200 |
| LTV:CAC ratio | 18.5× | 12.0× | 2.3× | 4.9× | 0.9× |
| Payback period | 0.8 months | 0.7 months | 11.1 months | 2.5 months | 4.4 months |
LTV:CAC benchmark: >3× = healthy · >5× = strong · >10× = exceptional. D2C and Amazon both exceed 10× — driven by GLP-1 therapy long-term adherence (low churn) and low digital CAC. Telehealth B2B CAC ($120) reflects physician seeding cost but $450 LTV still supports the channel. Corporate Wellness is relationship/gifting-led — LTV:CAC <1× intentional; it is a pipeline seeding channel, not a margin channel.
The critical assumptions a US investor will interrogate. Three require immediate action before approaching capital. Green = supportable now. Amber = needs evidence. Red = unresolved.
Morgan Stanley: 24M by 2026. Goldman consensus: 30M by 2030. Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly investor guidance confirms trajectory. Market size risk is low — the TAM is real and growing faster than any prior pharmaceutical adoption curve.
JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, Walmart already covering GLP-1 drugs. Nutrition adjacency is the logical and documented next step in employer benefit design. Category gap is structural — no incumbent with clinical credibility exists.
Calibrate raised $100M+. Ro at $5B valuation. Found and Sequence both growing. All actively prescribing and processing new patient initiations. Medium risk: telehealth GLP-1 prescribing is subject to FDA regulatory review — confirm current regulatory status before investor conversations.
Channel Key engaged. PolySure™ clinical claims differentiated. Category is nascent — first-mover advantage is real. Medium risk: Amazon SEO takes 3–6 months. Strategy, budget, and timeline must be locked before approaching capital. Present Channel Key plan and timeline in investor materials.
Signed contracts or LOI-stage agreements with Calibrate AND one other platform. 600+ patients by end of Year 1. This is the single most important execution assumption in the model. Currently unresolved — and a sophisticated investor will identify it immediately. Pipeline evidence is required before the raise.
COGS per unit must support 60% gross margin at the initial 3-month manufacturing run. PolySure™ certification, BC30™, and collagen peptides all add meaningful input cost. The difference between 55% and 60% GM = $164K EBITDA at Y3 base revenue. This must be confirmed with the manufacturer before the raise is documented.
The 4× Y1-to-Y2 growth is mechanically explained (Amazon full year, TH B2B activation) but will be challenged hard in any investor conversation. A channel-by-channel monthly revenue bridge for Year 1 and Year 2 is required. The current model is annual — build the monthly detail before distributing to investors.
Strategic acquirers are active in this space — Ro acquired January AI, Hims acquiring nutrition brands, Nestlé Health Science actively building GLP-1 adjacency. The exit buyer universe needs to be documented in a board paper before approaching institutional investors. The EV story requires a named acquirer set.
The PolySure™ platform is the most defensible moat in the model — but its IP value is not yet quantified or independently assessed. An IP valuation opinion, even directional, would meaningfully strengthen the investment narrative and support a higher EV multiple in investor conversations.
The three RED items are resolvable before any investor approach — they are execution and documentation tasks, not business model flaws. Resolve them in order: (1) Telehealth B2B LOI or signed agreement, (2) Factory CoGS confirmation, (3) Monthly channel revenue bridge model. Once resolved, the investment case is substantially stronger and the raise is defensible under institutional-grade due diligence.
This is not a product play. It is a category creation play — backed by the only bioactive platform in the world that can deliver clinical-grade GLP-1 nutritional support at consumer scale.
Mānuka Performance does not compete in the supplement market. It competes in the clinical nutrition infrastructure market — a category that does not yet exist in a structured form, but will within 18–24 months. The window to establish first-mover advantage, physician credibility, and telehealth B2B distribution infrastructure is open now. It will not be open in 36 months.
The investment thesis has three layers: (1) CPG revenue at a 60% gross margin — financeable on its own merits; (2) Telehealth B2B infrastructure that creates a recurring, high-margin revenue base uncorrelated with consumer acquisition cost; and (3) PolySure™ IP that supports a strategic exit multiple meaningfully above CPG peers.
The strategic acquirer pool — Nestlé Health Science, Ro, Hims & Hers, Abbott Nutrition, Thorne, Amway, Herbalife — is already active in GLP-1 adjacency. The combination of physician credibility (Dr Marc Stevens MD), clinical certification infrastructure (PolySure™, BC30™, Informed Sport), and telehealth B2B distribution makes Mānuka Performance the most credible acquisition target in this space within a 3–5 year horizon.
| Capability | Any Competitor | Mānuka Performance |
|---|---|---|
| 7-polyphenol batch CoA (ISO-17025) | Never | ✓ Every batch |
| NZ indigenous provenance + FernMark | Cannot replicate | ✓ Licensed |
| BC30™ FDA GRAS in honey matrix | No | ✓ GI-PRO™ platform |
| Physician CMO / US Co-President | Rare / expensive | ✓ Dr Marc Stevens MD |
| Telehealth B2B distribution network | Not built | ✓ In development |
| WADA Safe / HASTA batch tested | Rare | ✓ All SKUs |
| Human RCT evidence programme | Very few brands | ✓ Active |
| Māori guardianship + cultural IP | Cannot replicate | ✓ Structural moat |
Strategic acquirers in this space are buying: (a) clinical credibility they cannot build fast enough organically, (b) telehealth B2B distribution they cannot access without physician trust, and (c) IP that elevates their GLP-1 nutrition position above generic supplement competitors. Mānuka Performance offers all three. The PolySure™ platform, in particular, is the asset that supports the 15–20× multiple scenario — because it cannot be purchased, replicated, or synthesised. It is sourced from NZ native honey varieties with multi-year lead times to certify.
Resolve the three red assumptions and complete the two documentation actions. The investment case is substantially stronger on the other side.
Secure at least one signed or LOI-stage agreement with Calibrate, Ro, or Found before approaching investors. This removes the single biggest RED flag in the model. Pipeline evidence — even a named platform in active negotiation — changes the investor conversation materially.
Obtain written COGS confirmation from the manufacturer confirming 58–62% gross margin at the initial production run volume. The difference between 55% and 60% GM is $164K Y3 EBITDA at base revenue. This is due diligence item #1 for any investor.
Build a month-by-month channel revenue bridge for Y1 and Y2. The 4× step-up from $484K to $1.93M is mechanically justified but will be the first question in every investor meeting. Monthly granularity makes it defensible. Amazon Month 4, TH B2B Month 4, D2C ramp — tell the monthly story.
Commission a board paper mapping the strategic acquirer universe: Nestlé Health Science, Abbott Nutrition, Ro, Hims & Hers, Thorne, Amway, and GLP-1 pharma adjacency plays. Name the deal logic for each. The EV multiple story requires a named acquirer set — not just a multiple range in a table.
Commission a directional PolySure™ IP valuation from a qualified IP valuation firm. Even a preliminary opinion on the platform's strategic value is sufficient to include in investor materials. This is the hidden asset that elevates the EV multiple from CPG comparable to platform comparable.